The spatial sorting and matching of skills and firms by Mion, Giordano & Naticchioni, Paolo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The spatial sorting and matching of skills
and firms
Giordano Mion and Paolo Naticchioni
Universite´ Catholique de Louvain
February 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1721/
MPRA Paper No. 1721, posted 8. February 2007
The Spatial Sorting and Matching of Skills and Firms∗
Giordano Mion†and Paolo Naticchioni‡
October 2006
CORE DP 2006/99
Abstract
Using a matched employer-employee database for Italy we look at the spatial distribution of
wages across provinces. This rich database allows us to contribute at opening the black box
of agglomeration economies exploiting the micro dimension of the interaction among economic
agents, both individuals and firms. We provide evidence that firm size and particularly skills are
sorted across space, and explain a large portion of the spatial wage variation that could otherwise
be attributed to aggregate proxies of agglomeration externalities. Our data further support the
assortative matching hypothesis, that is“good” workers match on the labor market with “good”
firms, and we further show that assortative matching is not driven by a co-location of workers and
firms of similar quality. Finally, we point out that this assortative matching is negatively related
to local market size.
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1 Introduction
Imbalances in terms of wages, GDP per capita, growth, and labor markets’ outcomes are pervasive
features of the economic landscape. Spatial disparities are in fact large in both developed and devel-
oping countries attracting a lot of political concern and, in the case of EU, they are so strategically
important to be ranked at the top of the political agenda.1 As for wages, Glaeser and Mare (2001)
find that they are 33% higher is US cities compared to outside metropolitan areas. Data evidence
on EU as a whole is less systematic. However, a number of country-based studies, like for instance
Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2004), show that wages vary considerably across space.
There is also a large body of empirical literature concerned with measurements of growth and pro-
ductivity advantages stemming from agglomeration economies such as urbanization and localization
externalities, and market potential. However, despite some relevant exceptions,2 most frameworks
deal with aggregate proxies for agglomeration, neglecting the very nature of these externalities which
comes from economic agent -individuals and firms- interactions.
The fact that “good” workers and firms are sorted across space is the flip side of agglomeration
economies. In this paper, we explicitly deal with two agents’ characteristics, namely workers’ skills and
firms’ size. In particular, we estimate a Mincerian equation using a matched panel employer-employee
database for Italy and we consider as skills all the time-invariant attributes of a worker that add to
his productivity, using individual fixed eﬀects. Exploiting the information of individual data is crucial
in order to assess the importance of skills and firm size in explaining standard aggregate measures of
agglomeration economies as well as to get some intuition about the underlying mechanisms leading
to such sorting. In other words, we aim at contributing to open the black box of agglomeration
externalities.
From the view point of theory there at least three explanations for the positive sorting of worker
skills across space. First, cities provide valuable consumption amenities for skilled workers, such as
theaters, museums, cultural activities, etc. Second, as suggested by Moretti (2004), bigger cities oﬀer
higher returns to education (private plus social) fostering the investments in human capital. Third,
in a dynamic perspective cities provide a better environment for the accumulation of human capital
thanks to more eﬀective face-to-face interactions like in Glaeser and Mare (2001).
As for the sorting of firms, labor market matching models like Kim (1989) and Helsley and Strange
(1990) are consistent with bigger and more productive firms being disproportionately located in large
1The reduction of income disparities among EU regions involve much of the political debate with Structural and
Cohesion Funds, both aiming at the reduction of imbalances, correspond to approximately one third of the EU budget
in the period 1994-1999.
2See Glaeser and Mare (2001), Henderson (2003), and Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon(2004).
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cities. The size of the local labor market improves the quality of matching between firms and workers
boosting productivity. A more recent strand of literature, started with the model of Melitz (2003),
takes explicitly into account individual firms’ heterogeneity in productivity. In these models, firms
diﬀer exogenously in their productivity but they can still coexist on the same market because they sell
diﬀerentiated varieties. The size of the market and the degree of product substitutability determine
the minimum eﬃciency threshold needed to break even and, as the market gets larger, competition
drives less productive firms to exit.
Our individual data on wages supports the existence of sorting, for both individuals and firms,
and this is robust even after controlling for endogeneity in location choice. In particular, we show
that nearly 75% of raw wage variation across Italian provinces is explained by diﬀerences in individual
skills. Furthermore, we provide evidence that sorting is essentially “static”, i.e. due to non migrants.
On the contrary, the sorting of firms accounts only for a small fraction of wage variability. These
results suggest that our proxies for individual and firm heterogeneity are important, and account for
a large portion of agglomeration externalities as measured by standard aggregate indicators.
Another interesting dimension we can exploit in our data is the connection between employer and
employee information, testing the existence of a positive correlation between individual skills and
firm size (the so called assortative matching). The evidence in the literature concerning assortative
matching is mixed. In our data, we do find a positive correlation (“good” workers matching with
“good” firms) and we further show that results are not driven by co-location issues. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first analysis of the spatial dimension of assortative matching using an
employer-employee database.
Quite interestingly, we also break down this result across provinces, showing that the degree of
assortative matching is negatively related to local market size. This result is robust to the use of a
more accurate measurement of general human capital as well as to the inclusion of a province specific
firm size premium. This original result contrasts with Wheeler (2001), while being in line with Kim
(1989). As long as firm-worker specific attributes are taken into account, then one can argue that
the larger the size of a market the larger is the possibility of a worker/firm to find a partner with
some specific characteristics which are valuable assets for the matching. Therefore, general attributes
should became relatively less important the larger is the size of the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical background
of our analysis. In Section 3 we present the data, the spatial variable definitions as well as some
descriptive statistics, while in Section 4 we point out what a matched employer employee database
can tell us more about spatial imbalances. Section 5 is devoted to the econometric results, in which
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we also deepen the endogeneity issue. Section 6 further discusses the evidence of sorting and matching
coming out from our estimates. Finally, conclusions are reported in Section 7.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Agglomeration Economies
The term “agglomeration economies” refers to those externalities stemming from the interaction of
agents across space that positively aﬀects local productivity and growth. There is a large body of liter-
ature3, both theoretical and applied, that has identified several mechanisms leading to the emergence
of agglomeration economies. However, despite the large number of empirical studies, data limitations
and the lack of a unified underlying theoretical framework make it diﬃcult to disentangle the relative
importance of diﬀerent microfoundations that are, to a large extent, observationally equivalent. One
of the goal of this paper is to contribute to this debate on the microfoundations of agglomeration
economies by looking at the relative importance of individual versus firms’ characteristics. Models of
agglomeration externalities concern firms and workers, implicitly assuming that one or both types of
agents are more productive where the externality is at work (spatial sorting of workers and/or firms).
However, most of the underlying theoretical and empirical studies are about firm productivity and
location and despite some relevant exceptions, like Glaeser and Mare (2001), Henderson (2003), and
Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2004), the empirical analysis has focused on aggregate rather than
individual data. Our data allow us to match individual workers and firms’ characteristics and can
help to get a deeper and more accurate understanding of agglomeration economies.
In this paper, we will focus on the most widely investigated agglomeration economies: urbanization
externalities, market potential and localization externalities.
Urbanization externalities represent one of the most important local interaction type related to
the size of a market. The idea that market size has a positive impact on local productivity goes
back to Marshall (1890) and have been formalized by Abdel Rahman, and Fujita (1990) among
others. The urban literature has identified various mechanisms leading economic density to foster
growth and productivity like knowledge cross-fertilization, increasing returns to scale in a non-tradable
intermediate goods sector, matching of diﬀerentiated skills, etc.4 Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Combes
(2000) provide evidence in favor of the positive role of local employment density (a proxy for market
size) on productivity and employment growth.
The second spatial externality investigated is the one typically arising in models mixing increasing
3See for instance the recent reviews of Duranton and Puga (2004) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004).
4See Duranton and Puga (2004) for a discussion of the microfoundations of urbanization economies.
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returns and transportation costs where the reduced form of agglomeration incentives takes the form of
a Market potential function. Loosely speaking, Market potential can be defined as the demand that a
firm located in j can have access to in a world where trade is costly. The Market potential concept has
been first put forward by Harris (1954) and then formalized by the so called new economic geography
literature5. The basic mechanism underpinning agglomeration externalities in these models is the
trade-oﬀ between the need to be close to consumers to reduce transportation costs (dispersion force),
and the desire to concentrate production in order to exploit increasing returns to scale (agglomeration
force). If trade costs are suﬃciently low, then agglomeration dominates and firms massively relocate in
areas providing better access to consumers’ demand so boosting local factor prices and in particular
nominal wages. Mion (2004) and Hanson (2005) provide evidence that local nominal wages are
positively related to market potential, the latter being measured either “structurally” or with the
simple average of disposable income coming from surrounding locations as originally proposed by
Harris (1954).
Finally, localization externalities refer to the advantage stemming from the concentration of a
specific industry in a given location (local specialization). The idea that local specialization fosters
growth and productivity also goes back to Marshall (1890) that already identifies three channels (la-
bor market pooling, input sharing and knowledge spillovers) through which localization externalities
take place. The models of Henderson (1974) and Duranton and Puga (2004) among others provide
a micro-foundation for these externalities. On the other hand, the empirical works of Glaeser et al
(1992) and Henderson (2003), which use a measure of local sectoral specialization to proxy for such
externalities, suggest that localization externalities play an important role in local growth and pro-
ductivity. Moreover, Rosenthal and Strange (2001) provide some evidence on the relative importance
of labor market pooling, input sharing and knowledge spillovers.
2.2 The Spatial Sorting of Workers’ Skills and Firms’ Size
The fact that “good” workers and firms are sorted across space is the flip side of agglomeration
economies. In this paper, we explicitly deal with two agents’ characteristics, namely workers’ skills
and firms’ size. One goal of the paper is to quantify the importance of skills and firm size in explaining
standard aggregate measures of agglomeration economies as well as to get some intuition about the
underlying mechanisms leading to such sorting.
The sorting of workers’ skills
5See for instance Fujita, Krugman and Venable (1999) or Fujita and Thisse (2002).
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The term skills refers here to workers’ attributes like ability and education that are in principle
time invariant and increase a worker productivity irrespectively of the characteristics of the employer.
The idea that skilled workers are sorted across space is, although less explored than other factors,
not new in the urban literature and, as previously argued, it might be a crucial element in getting a
better understanding of the microfoundations of spatial externalities.
The oldest explanation is the so-called “bright lights” hypothesis. Skilled workers are known to be
more mobile. Therefore, as long as extensive consumption amenities and services provided in cities are
particularly valuable assets for them, they would prefer cities as the destination of their migrations.
Tabuchi and Yoshida (2000) find that the elasticity of “real” wage with respect to city size is negative
suggesting that people living in cities do accept a lower real wage to enjoy consumption benefits.
Another possibility, which does not necessarily involves migrations, is that cities provide higher
returns to educations so that residents find it profitable to invest more in the accumulation of human
capital that would then foster local productivity and growth. Moretti (2004) actually finds some
evidence of a positive relation between city density and returns to education (private plus social),
while Borjas, Bronas and Trejo (1992) find that the skills composition and the size of internal US
migrations are well explained by interstate diﬀerences in the returns to education which are pretty
heterogeneous across space.
On the other hand, Glaeser and Mare (2001) discuss a third dynamic mechanisms. Large cities
can be in fact places where the accumulation of human capital can be faster than anywhere else due to
the intense and stimulating face to face interactions. The authors further provide evidence in favor of
their conjecture by looking at whether individuals moving from a small (large) to a large (small) city
experience a substantial wage increase (decrease). In particular they find that only workers moving to
a large city get a substantial wage change and that this increase occurs only few years after moving as
if they had to accumulate human capital locally before their productivity (and wage) could raise. On
the other side workers moving to a small city earn virtually the same wage suggesting that the human
capital they had previously accumulated in large cities does not depreciate after the migration, and
is a valuable asset also in their new job.
Finally, the link between human capital accumulation and space finds some support even in the
more recent new economic geography literature. Redding and Schott (2003) develop a model where
if skill-intensive sectors have higher trade costs, more pervasive input-output linkages or stronger
increasing returns to scale, then remoteness depresses the skill premium and therefore incentives for
human capital accumulation. The authors further provide evidence that countries with a lower market
potential display lower levels of educational attainments.
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The sorting of firms’ size
There are many theoretical frameworks where agglomeration economies translate into higher firms’
productivity, with the latter being usually positively related to the size of the firm. Parallel to the
case of workers’ skills, the link between space, productivity and firm size could be a powerful insight
to open the black-box of agglomeration economies.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), when looking at the impact of market size on firms’ entry decisions
and markups, show that markups should be lower the larger the local market. In this framework,
firm size should increase with local demand for firms to break even. The positive correlation between
firm size and economic density has been documented in Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005).
Labor market matching models like Kim (1989) and Helsley and Strange (1990) are further con-
sistent with bigger and more productive firms being disproportionately located in large cities. The
size of the local labor market improves the quality of matching between firms and workers boosting
productivity. However, when market size expands, fiercer labor market competition make it feasible
only for a less than proportional number of firms to survive, and these firms will employ more workers,
i.e; they are bigger.
A more recent strand of literature, started with the model of Melitz (2003), takes explicitly into
account individual firms’ heterogeneity in productivity. In Melitz (2003), firms diﬀer exogenously
in their productivity but they can still coexist on the same market because they sell diﬀerentiated
varieties. However, due to a fixed cost in production, a firm must be suﬃciently productive with
respect to competitors to be able to break-even. The size of the market and the degree of product
substitutability determine the minimum eﬃciency needed to survive. As the market gets larger,
competition becomes fiercer and less productive firms exit. Therefore, firms are bigger and more
productive the larger is the local market. Moreover, Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) show that firms’
size and productivity should also be positively correlated to market accessibility which is closely linked
to the concept of market potential. Many empirical works, like Pavnick (2002), Syverson (2004), and
Bernard et al (2006) have confirmed the main testable implications of these models.
3 Data Description and Spatial Variables
3.1 Data Sources
In this paper we use an administrative database provided by INPS (the Italian Social Security Insti-
tute). More specifically, we work on a panel version of this database, elaborated by ISFOL, which
matches employer and employee information, a similar database like the one used by Kramarz, Abowd,
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and Margolis (1999) for France. The sample units are full-time workers in all private sectors but agri-
culture, covering 14 years from 1985 to 1998.6
As far as workers’ characteristics are concerned, the database contains many individual information
like age, gender, qualification, place of birth, workplace, date of beginning and end of the current
worker contract, the social security contributions, if the worker is either part time or full time, the
gross yearly wage, and the number of worked weeks and days.
As for firms, we have the following set of information: plant location (province), the average
number of employees, the sector, the date of start up and the one of shut down (if any). This means
that, contrary to other database, we are able to exactly identify where a job takes place since the
headquarter and plant location are two separate pieces of information.
As far as job location is concerned, we use data on the 95 Italian provinces.7 The choice of
provinces represents a good compromise between a detailed classification of the Italian territory and
data availability. Provinces are in fact suﬃciently big to entirely cover cities area and small enough
to provide a rich data variability. Data on yearly sectoral employment at the provincial level are
provided by INPS and refers to the period 1986-1998. The corresponding sectoral decomposition is
the ATECO 81, which splits the Italian economy in 52 sectors (at 2digit level). Province data on
education (year 1991), and households’ disposable income (period 1991-2000) are provided by the
“Istituto Tagliacarne”.
As for historical data, information about provinces population in 1861, 1881, and 1901 comes from
a re-elaboration of population census by municipalities operated by ISTAT. Data on local sectoral
specialization for the year 1951 comes from the “Ateco51-91” database, which is still provided by
ISTAT. Finally, data on surface and crow-fly distances among provinces’ centroids comes from Arcview
GIS software.
3.2 Spatial Variables definitions
In this section we define our spatial variables. As for urbanization externalities, we measure them
like in Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Combes (2000):
Densj,t = ln
∙
emplj,t
areaj
¸
(1)
6The sample scheme has been set up to follow individuals born on the 10th of March, June, September and December,
and therefore the proportion of this sample on the Italian employees population is approximately of 1/90. Moreover,
apprenticeships and part time workers are excluded from the dataset, since the attention is focused on standard labor
market contracts (blue collar, white collar and managers). Further, self-employed are not included in INPS database.
7Actually, in 2006 the Italian provinces are 103. The transition between 95 and 103 took place in 1995. In this paper
we consider the initial classification of 95 provinces, converting subsequent changes of definitions to the old classification.
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where emplj,t is employment in location j at time t, while areaj is a location surface in square km.
As standard, we consider the log, and we do the same for all the other location variables in order to
interpret parameters as elasticities and to ease comparison with previous studies.
The market potential is instead defined using the following spatially weighted component, as
originally introduced by Harris (1954) to measure the “potential” demand for goods and services
produced in a location j = 1, 2, .., J :
MPj,t = ln
⎡
⎣X
k 6=j
Yk,t d−1jk
⎤
⎦ , (2)
where Yk,t is an index of purchasing capacity of location k (usually disposable income, as in this paper)
at time t, and djk is the distance between two generic locations j and k.8 The choice to neglect the
disposable income of location j, which is rather standard in the literature,9 helps to mitigate both
endogeneity problems and possible multicollinearity with the density variable.10 Furthermore, the
use of a power minus one function of distance (d−1jk ) is justified by the gravity equation literature
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and the trade nature of this literature. It is true that there exist frameworks dealing with the
structural estimation of NEG models, like Head and Mayer (2004) and Mion (2004), which use more
sophisticated measures of market potential than (2). However, our goal here is to provide a measure
of the magnitude of agglomeration economies and not to estimate the underlying model parameters.12
Finally, as a proxy for local sectoral specialization (Specj,s,t) of location j in sector s at time t,
we use the following index, as in Combes (2000):
Specj,s,t = ln
∙
emplj,s,t/emplj,t
empls,t/emplt
¸
. (3)
8 It is interesting to note that Harris (1954) did not provide any model to justify its concept of market potential. This is
not surprising since general equilibrium models dealing with increasing returns to scale, space, and product diﬀerentiation
have been introduced only recently. In particular, Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) show that market potential
functions can be obtained from many spatial general-equilibrium models, thus providing the theoretical background for
the use of such an approach.
9See Mion (2004) and Hanson (2005).
10High density provinces are usually characterized by a large disposable income. This means that, if we considered
in the market potential index the disposable income for location j, then the correlation between density and market
potential would be relatively high involving possible multicollinearity problems.
11See Disdier and Head (2004).
12To this respect Head and Mayer (2004), when comparing Harris’ market potential with a more elaborated measure,
did not find any strong evidence in favor of the latter in terms of predictive power.
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3.3 Database Construction and Descriptive Statistics
In our empirical analysis we focus on the period 1991-1998 for which all individual and spatial data
are jointly available. Our unit of analysis is a worker i at year t.13 We further eliminate those
extreme observations below (above) the 1st (99th) percentile of the wage distribution, and consider
only workers with at least two observations in the period in order to be able to perform a within
transformation on our data.
Moreover, in this paper we focus on male individuals with age between 24 and 39 (when they
first enter in the database), i.e. 31,457 workers and 200,015 observations. The choice to consider
only male workers is quite standard in the wage equation setting, as for instance in Topel (1991).
Women wage dynamics is in fact often aﬀected by non-economic factors, meaning that standard
economic and spatial covariates are less relevant in explaining their carriers. Furthermore, as we will
see in Section 4, workplace changes are crucial for estimations and young male workers represents
a relatively homogeneous category with respect to migration. Indeed, the related literature - like
Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) and Dahl (2002) - usually focuses on them.14 Finally, the need
to have a good measure of skills, that we measure as individual fixed eﬀects, leads us to consider
only workers with more than four observations ending up with a panel of 24,353 workers and 175,700
observations.15
The dependent variable in our regressions is the (log) of gross monthly wage in thousands of
Italian liras. Data have been deflated and the base year is 1991. As for individual characteristics,
we focus on the standard covariates usually used in a Mincerian equation: age, age2, and two other
dummies for blue collar and white collar with the residual category being managers, as well as time
and sectoral dummies.
Moreover, in order to capture firms’ heterogeneity we use the log of firm size. The positive
and strongly significant relation between wages and firm size has been extensively studied in labor
13As for job records of a worker, we consider only one employer-employee match per year. In particular, we assign
to each individual i the monthly wage and job characteristics of the longest job record in year t. The choice of the
monthly wage - reconstructed using yearly wage and worked weeks - is meant to control for both the actual time worked
during a year as well as for diﬀerences in actual vs reported working time which can systematically vary across space.
More precisely, as wage variable we use the yearly wage paid by the firm to the employee, divided by the number of
worked weeks, and then reporting the week wage at the monthly level. We did not use the information of the worked
days because Ginzburg et al (1998) claimed that this variable in the south could be underestimated, leading to higher
daily wages in this region, which is indeed supposed to be the poorest Italian area.
14 It is for example well known that male prime-age workers are more mobile. Indeed, in our full sample of 92,579
workers 10.49% of them change location at least once in the observation period, with respect to the 13.54% of male
prime-age.
15Estimations of spatial externalities in the database with all male prime-age workers with more than two observations
(31,457 individuals) are available upon request and are virtually identical. The same conclusions further apply when
we consider a wider database not restricted to male prime age (92,579 individuals and 560,040 observations): signs of
coeﬃcients are the same even if they are smaller in magnitude, as expected.
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economics. The seminal papers are probably the ones of Krueger and Summers (1988) and Brown
and Medoﬀ (1989). In particular, this literature points out a persistent positive eﬀect of firm size on
wages, identifying several diﬀerent explanations.16
As spatial variables we consider employment density, market potential, and localization external-
ities as defined (respectively) in (1), (2), and (3). Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in
our sample are provided in Table 1.
Spatial imbalances come out quite clearly from our data. The spatial distribution of wages is in
fact far from being uniform across Italian provinces suggesting that location matters. This does not
have to be taken for granted, since Italy is a country characterized by a very important centralized
wage setting where, within each sector, contracts have to respect several national based constraints
like a minimum wage. However, it is worth noting that firms are allowed to integrate the national
contract with a company specific contract in which, for instance, wages can be increased.
To provide some figures about spatial imbalances, the ratio between the highest average province
wage (considering time averages over the period) and the lowest one is 1.52, and this ratio is increasing
overtime (1.46 in 1991 and 1.56 in 1998). This result still holds if the diﬀerent qualifications are taken
into account. For instance, the same rate is equal to 1.40 for blue collar workers, 1.53 for white
collar and 2.82 for managers. Even considering a less extreme indicator than the max/min like the
90th/10th percentile ratio we still derive a relevant wage variation. This ratio is in fact 1.24 for all
workers, while being 1.22 for blue collar, 1.17 for white collar and 1.33 for managers.
4 What Can Matched Employer-Employee Panel Data Tell us More
About Spatial Imbalances?
Most of the studies that has dealt with the measurement of spatial externalities, like Glaeser et al
(1992), Ciccone and Hall (1996), and Mion (2004), use aggregate data on labor, wages and produc-
tivity. Using individual level data provides relevant steps forward in the analysis. First of all, it is
possible to control for possible composition eﬀects due to individual characteristics like age, gender
and qualification.17
16For instance, some papers claim that only more productive and big size firms can aﬀord to pay eﬃciency wages in
order to attract and keep skilled workers (Krueger and Summers, 1988), while other papers stress the importance of
unions power in big size firms and the consequent impact on wages. Further, another explanation concerns the fact that
big size firms make use of a better screening device in order to select high skilled workers. For a survey concerning all
this literature see Oi and Idson (1999).
17 Indeed, in our data both the age and the gender of workers are strongly correlated with economic density and the
same apply, although to a smaller extent, to market potential. For instance, female workers can be found more easily in
big cities with the working population being a little older. Since female workers earn less and at the same time wages are
positively correlated with age, the sign of the bias coming from omitting these individual control variables on economic
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A second more relevant point in using individual data is that the panel nature of our data allow
us to control for a very important source of wage variation: unobserved time-invariant individual
characteristics (skills). Education is certainly one important component of individual skills, but
the use of individual fixed eﬀects is crucial to capture other important time-invariant features, for
instance ability, that would be otherwise neglected. This choice is quite standard in labor economics18,
especially when the core of the analysis is not the estimate of the returns to education. Accounting
for such individual eﬀects turns out to be particularly interesting when their distribution across
space is uneven. Glaeser and Mare (2001), Moretti (2004), and Redding and Schott (2003) provide
the rationale for an interplay between skills and space. In particular, these frameworks suggest that
skilled workers should be disproportionately found in regions characterized by high density and market
potential. Therefore, skills can explain a not negligible share of the agglomeration externalities as
usually measured by raw aggregate proxies.
Another important element we can deal with our data is firms’ heterogeneity. On the one side,
there is an important literature focusing on the positive relation between firm size and wages. Nev-
ertheless, as long as there is no correlation between firm size and location characteristics, omitting
the former would have no impact on the estimates of spatial externalities. To this respect, the recent
literature on heterogeneous firms (started with the work of Melitz, 2003) predicts that the size of the
local market is positively related to firm size and productivity. Indeed, in our data firm size in posi-
tively correlated with density (0.12), and this correlation is strongly significant even after introducing
sectoral dummies. All of this suggests that controlling for firm size may be considered as another
relevant underlying microeconomic factor behind agglomeration externalities.
Finally, the capability to match employer and employee information allow us to investigate the
extent to which skills are correlated with firm size, i.e. the existence of a possible assortative matching.
The issue of the presence of an assortative matching has been recently questioned in the literature.
However, we are able to go a bit further in the analysis -see section 6.3- by assessing whether the
observed correlation is just due to co-location of both big firms and skilled workers in cities.
4.1 Econometric Specification and Identification
Once established the importance of using matched employer-employee data we can proceed in our
empirical analysis. In particular we use an augmented Mincerian equation that combines standard
features of labor economics with spatial externalities:
density is (in this case) undetermined a priori.
18See for instance Krueger and Rouse (1998).
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wi,t = B
0
1Ii,t +B
0
2Ff(i,t),t + γ0Densj(i,t),t + γ1MPj(i,t),t + γ2Specj(i,t), s(f(i,t),t), t + δt + ui + εi,t (4)
where subscript i refers to individuals, t to time, j to location, f to firms and bold variables refer
to vectors. The dependent variable is the logarithm of gross monthly wage, ui is an individual eﬀect
(skills), and δt is a time eﬀect. The term Ii,t = {Agei,t, Age2i,t, Bc dummyi,t, Wc dummyi,t}
0
is a
battery of individual characteristics while Ff(i,t),t contains variables that controls for firm f features.
The latter is defined either by Ff(i,t),t = {is(f(i,t),t), ln(FirmSizef(i,t),t)}0 , where is(f(i,t),t) is a set of
industry dummies and ln(FirmSizef(i,t),t) is log of firm f size (both time varying), or by a fixed
eﬀect Ff(i,t) (one for each firm) as in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Finally, Densj(i,t), t,
MPj(i,t), t and Specj(i,t), s(f(i,t),t), t indicate density, market potential and specialization, as defined in
(1), (2) and (3).19
Identification of spatial variables is crucial in our analysis. As long as OLS are used, both the
between and within variance identify γ0, γ1, and γ2 and there is no major issue. However, with our
preferred within estimates, identification essentially comes (although not exclusively) from workers
changing sector/location. For instance, in the within dimension, only 14% of the variability of density
is actually due to density changing over time in a given location with the remaining 86% coming from
workers’ migrations.20 As for firms’ characteristics, a similar problem arises for the within estimations
of sectoral dummies and the coeﬃcient of ln(FirmSizef(i,t),t), which are essentially identified by
workers changing employer. Finally, when using the Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) estimator
(AKM), spatial variables are identified by their time variability only.
5 Regression results
In order to provide a clear overview of the relation between wages, skills, firms and spatial externalities,
we present in Table 2 estimations of (4) based on OLS, within estimates without firm size, within
estimates with firm size, as well as the firm and individual fixed eﬀects estimator (AKM) of Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), from column (1) to (4) respectively. In all specifications, except AKM
19It is worth noting that in our notation the sectoral index s (referring to the 52 Ateco81 sectors), the location index
j (referring to the 95 provinces), and the firm index f depend ultimately upon the couple (i, t) because they vary when
an individual changes sector and/or province and/or firm at time t.
20 In order to compute these shares of the within variance we first attribute to each worker the same (initial) location
for the entire period and then we compute the (without migration) within variance of density. Finally, we compare this
within variance with the non-restricted variance that includes workers’ movements.
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where sectoral dummies cannot be separately identified from firm eﬀects,21 a complete set of time
and sectoral dummies are included.22
As for density and market potential, it is quite straightforward to observe that taking into account
individual eﬀects dampens simple OLS results (going from column (1) to (2)). Nevertheless, these
variables are always significant and elasticities are in line with economic meaningful values. In fact,
according to OLS, doubling density increases wages of 2.21%. Previous findings of Ciccone and Hall
(1996) for US and Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2004) for France found (respectively) something
around 5% and 3%. Our rather low value is probably due to the already mentioned fact that Italy
is characterized by a high degree of wage compression, for instance due to the sectoral minimum
wages set at the national level. Taking into account individual eﬀects further reduce this estimate, as
showed in the within estimations of column (2), where the coeﬃcient goes down to 0.74%.23 These
simple estimates suggest a strong positive correlation between individual skills, as measured by ui, and
density. Indeed, our within estimations provides a (significant) correlation of 0.21, which suggests
that sorting of skills in space is at work. These findings confirm those of Combes, Duranton and
Gobillon (2004) for France.
Concerning market potential, spatial sorting is also at work. OLS estimates suggest that doubling
market potential lead to a 10.88% increase in wages. Interestingly, in their aggregate analysis of the
impact of market potential on sectoral EU wages, Head and Mayer (2006) find a very similar result.
However, taking into account individual skills push down elasticity to 5% in the within estimates, in
this way showing that using individual data definitely matters in the estimates of spatial externalities.
The (significant) correlation between the ui and market potential is 0.09 which is significantly lower
than the one with density but still suggestive of a positive link between skills and those agglomeration
externalities stemming from NEG models. This result is consistent with the theoretical and empirical
findings of Redding and Schott (2003).
In columns (3) and (4), we further account for firms’ heterogeneity by means of (respectively)
firm size and firm fixed eﬀects. This is, to our knowledge, the first empirical framework dealing with
the joint individual and firm content of spatial externalities. Considering column (3), the firm size
elasticity with respect to wages is 1.94%, which is in line with previous findings for other countries.
For instance, Brown and Medoﬀ (1989) derive an elasticity value of around 3% for the US. As for the
21Sectoral dummies can be separately identified from firm eﬀects as long as firms change sector. However, there are
few of such changes in the data and even Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) do not deal with them.
22 It is worth noting that our estimates on the impact of Agei,t and Age2i,t, and the two dummies for blue and white
collar are in line with previous findings (Naticchioni and Panigo, 2004).
23Although this elasticity might seem really low, Di Addario and Patacchini (2006) find a very close result. Using
a similar database on individual wages where they also have information of workers’ education the authors find that
doubling density leads to a 0.53% increase in wages.
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impact on spatial variables, considering firm size slightly decrease the elasticities of density (0.56%)
and market potential (4.56%). Indeed, the size of firms is significantly correlated with both and
in particular with density (0.12), which is the one that experiences the strongest fall. However,
compared to the sorting of individuals, the sorting of firms entails a much weaker impact on spatial
externalities.24
These findings are confirmed by the more general AKM estimation in which the elasticity of density
slightly falls to 0.66% while market potential remains substantially stable compared to estimation in
column (2).25 The idea that firms’ heterogeneity may lead to dampen the magnitude of spatial
externalities has been put forward by Baldwin and Okubo (2004). Our results suggest that the eﬀect
of firms’ heterogeneity is small, especially if compared to the one induced by individuals.26
Finally, the impact of localization externalities, as proxied by our specialization measure, is always
very low in all specifications (between 0.55% and 0.01%) and weakly significant. This is consistent
with previous works on Italy and in particular with Cingano (2003). For this reason, we do not devote
to them much attention, and we will not discuss them further.
5.1 Endogeneity issues
In this subsection we explore the issue of endogeneity. Although within and AKM estimations pro-
vide useful insights on the issue of spatial sorting, the reliability of computed elasticities are in fact
conditional upon the validity of the underlying moments’ restrictions. In particular, it is assumed
that Cov(εi,s,Xi,t), where Xi,t represents the vector of all covariates, is equal to zero ∀ s, t. However,
as pointed out by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2004), some local characteristics are likely to
be endogenous to local wages. For instance, provinces experiencing a positive technological shock at
time t may attract migrants and thus lead to a positive correlation between density and/or market
24Another interesting issue is the sectoral scope of our analysis. One could in fact argue that there may be a
considerable sectoral heterogeneity with respect to spatial externalities. In Mion and Naticchioni (2005) we show
estimations obtained on the sub-sample of manufacturing workers that still confirm that the sorting of skills (firms) is
very strong (weak). Furthermore, coeﬃcients are only slightly diﬀerent from the ones of Table 2.
25 In particular, we use the order dependent person first method. As for the conditioning variables Z we use the
interactions between (mean) individual characteristics (age, age2, density, and market potential) and (mean) firms
characteristics (firm size, firm size2, and a 9 industry classification based on Ateco 81 one digit). Separate identification
of individual and firms eﬀects require ’connections’ within a group of workers and firms (see Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz,
2002). In our estimations we have 24,353 individuals and 28,719 firms forming 15,186 groups. We use all groups and
consequently have 37,886 separately identifiable individual and firm eﬀects. It is important to stress that these fixed
eﬀects fully account for both individual and firm time invariant characteristics. The fact of having many groups is
in fact only a constrain for the separate identification and comparability of firm and individual eﬀects. Therefore, as
comparison is only meaningful within a group, we do not report the correlation between the firm and workers’ eﬀects
and we base our analysis of the interaction between skills and firms’ characteristics on individual eﬀects and firm size.
26 It is worth noting that in the AKM estimation the identification of parameters γ1 and γ2 is due to the time-variability
of density and market potential only. Parameters are not so diﬀerent from column (4) where identification was basically
driven by migrations, showing that the self-selection bias problem may not be so important for our estimations, as we
will see later on.
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potential and the residual term. In particular, exogeneity of the location choice is violated whenever
workers make their employment choice on the basis of the actual wages at date t.
We deal with endogeneity by means of IV estimations that exploit the idea of Ciccone and Hall
(1996) of using deeply lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. In column (5) of
table 2 we show our within-IV results, which we believe are the most reliable estimates of spatial
externalities we can provide. More specifically, we use as instruments for spatial variables data on
specialization in 1951, density of population in 1861, 1881, and 1901, as well as a proxy for market
potential, calculated replacing aggregate disposable income of a province by its population in equation
(2), for the years 1861, 1881, and 1901.27 The use of deeply lagged levels of specialization, density
and market potential obey to the logic (expressed in Ciccone and Hall, 1996) that, as long as early
patterns of agglomeration do not reflect factors that influence productivity today, then they can be
used as instruments. To this respect, the presence of a structural break would provide the condition
for a natural experiment. Ciccone and Hall (1996) use late US 19th century data that are previous to
world war one, right after the civil war, and just at the beginning of railroad network construction.
Our instruments of density and market potential for Italy meet these needs as the Italian State was
created just after Garibaldi expedition in 1860 and the railroad network did not really develop until
late 19th century. Crucially, the Sargan test on over-identifying restrictions do not reject the validity
of our instruments, and this is quite a strong result considering that, with almost 200,000 observations,
the power of the test should be reasonably high.
As one can see, accounting for endogeneity alters the magnitude of spatial externalities. Compared
to within estimation in column (3) of Table 2, density goes from 0.56% to 0.20% and is only significant
at 10% level. By contrast market potential is just slightly aﬀected going from 4.53% to 4.64%. This
suggests that local economic density is much more aﬀected by endogeneity than market potential.
Nevertheless, diﬀerences with respect to within estimations are not significant at 1% and caution is
needed. As for the relative importance of density and market potential, all our estimations suggest
that the latter is more important in explaining spatial wage variation. The elasticity corresponding
to market potential is in fact always higher (with a gap that is statistically significant) and, when
considering “standardized” elasticities, this result still holds with the one corresponding to density
(market potential) being 0.0067 (0.0366).28 Both absolute and standardized elasticities thus suggest
27Note that in this way we assume that disposable income is proportional to the population.
28Such standardized (or beta) coeﬃcients are defined as the product of the estimated coeﬃcient and the standard
deviation of its corresponding independent variable, divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. They
actually convert the regression coeﬃcients into units of sample standard deviations giving a measure of how much
variability of the dependent variable may be explained by the regressor. See Wooldridge (2003, Section 6.1) for a further
description of this transformation.
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that, in Italy, pecuniary externalities play a crucial role in the spatial distribution of wages.29
6 The sorting of skills and firms across space and their interaction
Estimations in Table 2 show clearly that workers’ skills and firm size are crucial components of
agglomeration economies. All parameters reflecting standard proxies of agglomeration economies are
in fact dampened when firm size and (especially) individual fixed eﬀects are taken into account. In
this Section we provide further evidence on the magnitude and nature of firms and individuals’ sorting
across space.
6.1 Evidence on the sorting of workers’ skills
We have already argued that the correlation between fixed eﬀects ui (our measure of workers’ skills)
is positive and significant with respect to both density (0.21) and market potential (0.09).30 As for
urbanization externalities (proxied by employment density), we first split provinces in low density
(LD) and high density (HD) on the basis of the median of the (time average of) density in our
database.31 In Table 3, we then use the individual fixed eﬀects obtained from the regression in
column (5) of Table 2 and compute summary statistics of the distribution of skills of residents as well
as of migrants (based on workplace) from and to LD and HD provinces.32 Values represents mean
(across individuals) log wage deviations from the overall mean of ui (zero) and can thus be interpreted
as approximate percentage deviations.
Looking at the first column of Table 3, which shows the mean of the ui in LD and HD provinces,
it is very clear that workers in HD provinces are much more skilled (0.0474) compared to those in
29 In Mion and Naticchioni (2005) we carried out several robustness checks. First, we replicate for comparability
the estimation methodology used by Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2004), in which there is a further time-location
specific error component (vj(i,t),t) that can be thought as an idiosyncratic technological shock. In particular, we recover
the parameters of spatial externalities from a second step regression in which the dependent variable is a fixed location
eﬀect βj(i,t),t estimated in a first step within regression. Compared to our strategy, their methodology has the advantage
of accounting for the heteroschedasticity that comes from time-location shocks. However, when they first recover their
dummies without instrumenting, the endogeneity of spatial variables is still at work and can seriously bias estimates.
Indeed, in our replication of their estimation, the Sargan test does not accept the validity of instruments. However,
we were forced by the lower number of observations to identify time invariant location eﬀects only (βj(i,t)). Second,
we performed separate estimations for four macro areas, in order to check whether spatial eﬀects are possibly due to
diﬀerent returns on age, qualification, or firm size across space, and also to be sure that the North is not driving our
results. Also in this case results change only slightly.
30The same correlation is negative and very small (-0.01) with respect to specialization. Therefore, being both the
latter correlation not particularly strong and our instruments relatively weaker for our proxy of localization externalities,
we focus here on the link between skills, market potential and urbanization externalities. The same reasoning applies
to the analysis of firms’ sorting.
31The HD provinces are Torino, Varese, Milano, Vicenza, Venezia, Trieste, Bologna, Roma, Genova, Como, Bergamo,
Treviso, Padova, Modena, Firenze, and Napoli. Note that the median is computed across individual observations.
32Some individuals moving more than once may actually “score” on more than one category. The same applies to the
analysis resumed in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7.
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LD provinces (-0.0469). The average skills gap thus corresponds to a 9.43% diﬀerence in mean wage
between HD and LD provinces and standard errors (in parenthesis) reveal that this gap is highly
significant. The row spatial variation of wages between LD and HD provinces (simple mean of wages
across individuals and time in the two groups) equals to 12.78%. Therefore, almost 75% of row wage
variability across city size is explained by the sorting of workers’ skills.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 look at the dynamic aspect of skills’ distribution: migrations.
Before interpreting results, it is convenient to remind the reader that there exists a large body of
literature concerned with the link between migrations and skills. In particular, this literature strongly
suggests that migrants are not a random sample from the population of origin, with skills being a
crucial elements of this self-selection process (see, Borjas, 1987). However, even if there exists a
sorting of migrants by their skills, it is not always the case that people migrating are the most
skilled. As pointed out by Borjas (1987), selection may be either positive or negative depending on
the characteristics of the location of origin and destination. To this respect, Borjas, Bronas and Trejo
(1992) find that the skills composition and the size of internal US migrations are well explained by
interstate diﬀerences in the returns to skill: States that pay low returns to skills will see their best
workers leaving (positive selection), while States that pay high returns will experience an outflow of
unskilled workers (negative selection).33
Coherently with the idea that returns to skills are positively related to market size (Moretti, 2004),
the sorting in our data is positive from LD to HD provinces because the average skills of migrants
(0.0028) is significantly higher than those of the population of origin (-0.0469) although not as good
as those of the population of destination (0.0474). The reverse is true, and so sorting is negative as
expected, from HD to LD provinces. Furthermore, migrations within each group (LD to LD and HD
to HD) suggest that a sizeable positive sorting exists among HD provinces. However, one can wonder
to what extent these results hold when considering long-term migrations. To answer this question we
report in Table 4 the same summary statistics as in Table 3 with the diﬀerence that migrations are
now defined as working in a province diﬀerent from the one where the worker was born. Furthermore,
the first column now shows the distribution of skills based on birthplace instead of workplace. As one
can see, the sorting of migrants is qualitatively identical.
However, there is an additional remark to underline: the sorting of migrants has a little impact
on the overall sorting of skills across provinces. Although the sorting of migrants widens the skills
gap between LD and HD provinces - comparing average skills’ gap based on birthplace in column
33 In the migration literature, returns to skills are relative to the average worker and the distribution is supposed
symmetric. This means that, for the same average wage across space, a low skilled worker will receive a lower wage in
a high returns to skills location.
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(1) of Table 4 with the one based on workplace in column (1) of Table 3 - the diﬀerence is relatively
small. Those who are born in one of the two groups and do not move are already sorted in space and,
although 15% of people change group within the working age, this flow does not have a major impact.
Overall, these results suggest that spatial sorting is a pervasive feature aﬀecting not only static means
but also the dynamic evolution of skills’ distribution. However, much of the sorting comes from the
static component (non movers), while both the static and the dynamic evidence are coherent with
large cities being more attractive for skilled workers.34
Tables 5 and 6 provide similar summary data for the sorting of skills by market potential. As
suggested by the lower correlation between the ui and market potential, sorting is relatively less severe
here. The “static” sorting of skills by market potential - column (1) of Table 5 - corresponds to a
5.89% gap (compared to the 9.43% with respect to density) between wages of low market potential
(LMP) vs high market potential (HMP) provinces. Nevertheless, this 5.89% has to be compared with
the 8.16% row wage variation between LMP and HMP provinces. Even though in absolute terms the
skills’ distribution by market potential turns into a smaller wage variation, skills still explain almost
75% of row spatial wage variation. As for the sorting of migrants we obtain similar, although less clear,
results than in the case of the density breakdown. Sorting is certainly positive from LMP to HMP
provinces while there is little evidence of a negative sorting from HMP to LMP units. Nevertheless,
we can certainly claim that people migrating towards HMP destinations are always “better” than
those migrating to LMP provinces. These results are confirmed when looking at migrations based on
birthplace (Table 6), which further indicates that long-term migrations have a smaller impact of the
distributions of skills compared to the analysis based on density. Overall, these results suggest that
spatial sorting has (again) both a static and a dynamic component, which are both coherent with the
idea that higher market potential location are more attractive for skilled workers. Furthermore, the
static sorting (non movers) is still predominant.
So far, our findings are in line with the idea that returns to skills increase with both density
and market potential pushing (essentially non-movers) individuals to invest more in human capital
acquisition like in Moretti (2004) and Redding and Schott (2003). Nevertheless, we can’t really rule out
dynamic human capital accumulation mechanisms of the type described in Glaeser and Mare (2001).
Our data do not allow us to observe directly human capital accumulation across space. However we
can, as Glaeser and Mare (2001), look at a possible asymmetric eﬀect on wages after moving from
(to) a large city as an indirect evidence of a wage growth eﬀect. If urbanization externalities have
34 It is worth noting that migrations are very important to provide the required variability to identify our spatial
coeﬃcients. Hence, one might argue that job-to-job decisions could entail an impact (a bias) on the identification of the
spatial coeﬃcients provided in section 5. In Mion and Naticchioni (2005) we point out that the sign of this bias goes in
opposite directions depending on the type of migration and eventually cancels out.
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a dynamic content, meaning that human capital (skills) is a stock and its accumulation is faster
in cities, then wages do not necessarily fall when people that have accumulated such skills in big
cities move back to the periphery. Moreover, the gains of people migrating towards HD provinces
should not be entirely captured by their wages immediately after migration because such wages will
be increasing only over time. We test the consistency of this story with our data in Table 7. Following
Glaeser and Mare (2001), we construct a dummy for non-movers living in HD provinces and diﬀerent
dummies for movers. For workers leaving or moving to a HD provinces we use two sets of interacted
year dummies to examine the wage dynamics before and after the migration. The first column refers
to OLS estimations and the residual category are non-movers living in LD provinces. The second
column refers to within estimations and the residual category is all non-movers. All other variables
in equation (4) have been used as additional regressors. As one can see, there is some evidence of the
wage growth hypothesis only in OLS estimations, where wages increase over time for people moving
to HD provinces while no relevant wage losses are observed for people leaving HD locations. However,
the evidence on within estimation is more mixed. Results based on a market potential partition of
provinces -available upon request- are qualitatively similar and still provide only a mild support for
the wage-growth hypothesis.
6.2 Evidence on the sorting of firm size
Unfortunately, our data on firms are not as good as data on individuals and we can’t analyze the
dynamic content of the spatial sorting of firm size by means of re-locations. However, we can quantify
that static aspect of firms’ sorting that turns out to be much weaker than the sorting of individuals
by skills.
Table 8 shows the average firm size eﬀect by LD and HD provinces (column 1) and LMP and HMP
provinces (column 2). Values are obtained multiplying the firm size by the coeﬃcient associated to
this variables from the regression of column (5) in Table 2 and then averaging across space and
time. Figures represent the average percentage contribution to local wages implied by the local size
distribution of firms. As we already stressed, firm size is positively correlated (across firms) to both
density (0.13) and market potential (0.07). However, looking at the average firm size eﬀect by LD
and HD provinces - column (1) of Table 8 - reveals that it only accounts for a 0.72% wage gap in
favor of HD provinces as compared to the 9.43% row spatial variation of wages across the two groups.
This percentage is far below the gap explained by workers’ skills. To the extent that firm size is
a good proxy of firm quality, our results suggest that microfoundations of agglomeration economies
aiming at explaining wage diﬀerences across space should emphasize on workers’ heterogeneity. These
findings are confirmed by the breakdown of the firm size eﬀect by LMP and HMP provinces. Firm
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size distribution diﬀerences across provinces imply a 0.45% wage advantage of HMP provinces to be
compared with the 8.16% row wage variation.
6.3 Assortative Matching Across Space
Our data suggest that firms and individuals are sorted across space based on (respectively) their size
and skills. However, as we are able to match workers and firms, we can also investigate whether “good”
workers are matched to “good” firms (the so called assortative matching). There is a pretty large
number of studies concerned with this issue of matching. However, both theoretical and empirical
contributions point out that, although quite intuitive at first glance, the assortative matching result
is not as robust as expected. From the view point of theory, Abowd et al. (2004) and Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2006) discuss the role of matching frictions, (un)directed search, wage formation process,
scalar heterogeneity and constant returns to scale in order to obtain such a result.
As for empirical evidence, results largely depends on the proxy used to qualify a “good” firm.
Improving on Abowd et al (1999), Abowd et al. (2003) use firm fixed eﬀects to measure firm quality
and a special algorithm to obtain the otherwise computationally unfeasible exact OLS solution. They
find that the correlation with individual eﬀects (skills) is either slightly positive (for US) or negative
(for France). However, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) argue that the identification of firm fixed eﬀects
crucially depends upon workers’ mobility across firms that might be too scarce to get suﬃciently
accurate estimates of firm eﬀects. Furthermore, using French firm level data on log of value added
per worker as a proxy of firm quality, they show that the correlation with worker eﬀects is now positive
(0.27). In our data we actually find that the correlation between skills (individual fixed eﬀects) and
firm size is positive (0.35) and significant. To the extent that firm size is a meaningful variable
to capture the underlying firm productivity (an information that we do not have), our results thus
support the presence of an assortative matching. To this respect, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) show
that firm size is a valuable information in order to recover both a firm hiring eﬀort and productivity.
However, even if we observe such an assortative matching, it might in principle just be due to
co-location. Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) suggest that big and more productive plants should locate
in thick markets. At the same time, according to Glaeser and Mare (2001) and Moretti (2004), skilled
workers should be expected to be found disproportionately in big cities. Therefore the “aggregate”
correlation (0.35) we found between skills and firm size might just be a spurious result. The fact that
we specifically deal with space in our framework allows us to explore this issue more in details. The
conditional (with respect to density, market potential and specialization) correlation between the ui
and firm size is only slightly lower (0.34 compared to 0.35) to the unconditional one. This means - and
this is one of the main contribution of our paper - that co-location is not really an issue, suggesting
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that there is a deeper underlying complementarity between skills and firm size, like the one traced
for instance in Yeaple (2005).
Even more important, the correlation is positive and significant in each of the 95 Italian provinces,
ranging from 0.08 to 0.68. This latter result confirms that assortative matching comes essentially from
local labor market interactions. However, the large variability of the correlation across space opens
the issue of how local labor market conditions aﬀect such matching.
In our framework, skills are measured by time-invariant eﬀects that are specific to the individ-
ual and not to the individual-firm match. Therefore, they may be properly interpreted as worker
attributes (like ability and education) that are in principle time invariant and increase a worker pro-
ductivity irrespectively of the characteristics of the employer. At the same time firm size is also
a firm-specific characteristic which is not directly related to the match. Consequently, the correla-
tion between skills and firm size in a given labor marker measures the local degree of interrelation
between general individual and firm attributes. To this respect, Wheeler (2001) proposes a spatial
labor matching model where firms and individuals are “vertically” diﬀerentiated, and shows that the
correlation between workers and firms’ general quality attributes should increase with market size.
Wheeler (2001) further argues that the observed higher educational attainment and skill premium in
US cities indirectly support this hypothesis. This quite intuitive approach concerning the positive
relation between the degree of assortative matching and market size is rejected in our data. Figure 1
shows the scatter plot of the (time average of) density and degree of assortative matching in each of
the 95 Italian provinces together with the regression line. As one can notice, this relation is actually
negatively signed and the correlation between the two variables (-0.39) is actually significant at 1%
confidence level.
One might argue that our measure of skills is made up by both general and specific (to the match)
components, since it is approximated by individual fixed eﬀects. In order to mark out the impact of
specific human capital we restrict our analysis to the sub-sample of 10,965 workers that change firm
in the estimation period. In this subsample, our measure of skills is more strictly related to general
human capital because it does not change across diﬀerent matches. When considering this subsample,
the correlation between density and local assortative matching is still negative (-0.40) and significant.
Another possible explanation might refer to the heterogeneity in the firm size premium across
provinces, stemming from both local labor market conditions and economic structure, which are only
partially captured in our set of covariates. In order to control for this possibility we allow the coeﬃcient
of firm size to be province-specific. Quite interestingly, we find that this explanation partially holds,
since the correlation between firm size and skills reduces from -0.39 to a significant -0.16, suggesting
that the firm size premium decreases with market size.
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The negative correlation between the degree of assortative matching and market size is thus a
robust result. One way to interpret this negative relationship, which represents one of the contribution
of this papers, is to consider the “horizontal” dimension of skills and productivity like in Helsey
and Strange (1990). As long as firm-worker specific attributes are taken into account, then the
larger the size of a market the larger is the possibility of a worker/firm to find a partner with some
specific characteristics which are valuable assets for the matching. Therefore, general attributes
should became relatively less important the larger is the size of the market. In this line, Kim (1989)
proposes a framework that combines both general and specific skills with market size. Workers and
firms are horizontally diﬀerentiated regarding to (respectively) their job requirements and abilities.
The mismatch between a given worker ability and a firm job requirement represents a cost that can
be reduced by a worker investment in general human capital. However, a worker may also decide to
invest in specific human capital to increase his skill-specific productivity. When the size of the market
increases, workers invest more in specific human capital than in general human capital, because they
can find more easily a firm with job requirements close to their ability.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we show that using individual data is crucial in order to get into the black box of
agglomeration externalities. Our results provide evidence that the spatial sorting of firm size and (es-
pecially) skills explains a large portion of the raw spatial wage variation, so dampening the magnitude
of aggregate proxies for urbanization and localization externalities, as well as for market potential.
Using the matched nature of our database we can also state that, even after controlling for co-location
issues, an assortative matching between skilled workers and large firms is at work in the Italian labor
market. Moreover, we are able to further characterize this result showing that the assortative match-
ing is negatively related to the size of local labor market, which is consistent with the framework
developed by Kim (1989).
Our results suggest that the microfoundation of agglomeration externalities should devote more
eﬀort to model the process of human capital accumulation across space. Furthermore, there is a need
to collect further evidence about the specific vs general nature of human capital investments in cities.
Finally, it seems important to encourage a wider and deeper discussion concerning the interactions
between skills and firm heterogeneity, both at the empirical and theoretical levels.
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Variable Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(wage) 175700 6.4824 0.3625 3.1180 8.2036
Age 175700 34.1257 5.0713 24.0000 46.0000
Age
2
175700 1190.2820 350.7040 576.0000 2116.0000
Firmsize 175700 4.6278 2.7433 0.0000 12.2699
Bc Dummy 175700 0.6528 0.4761 0.0000 1.0000
Wc Dummy 175700 0.3319 0.4709 0.0000 1.0000
Specialization 175700 0.0622 1.0412 -8.7156 4.9706
Density 175700 3.9525 1.2167 0.6903 6.2398
Market Potential 175700 8.5566 0.2864 7.7637 9.0872
Specialization in 1951 175700 -0.0679 0.8887 -7.2878 3.6926
Density pop in 1861 175700 4.7640 0.6980 2.9671 6.7048
Density pop in 1881 175700 4.9202 0.6847 3.0494 6.8617
Density pop in 1901 175700 5.0708 0.7029 3.1931 6.9914
Market Potential in 1861 175700 12.5091 0.0667 12.4026 12.7018
Market Potential in 1881 175700 12.6485 0.0638 12.5404 12.8337
Market Potential in 1901 175700 12.7721 0.0633 12.6706 12.9480
Table 1. Summary Statistics
All variables (except Sex, Age, Ageˆ2 , Bc Dummy, and Wc Dummy) are, coherently with their definition in the text, 
expressed in natural logarithm. Wages are in log of thousands liras while Market Potential is in log of billions liras. Both 
are in real terms (base 1991). Market Potential and Density in 1861-1901 are computed on the basis of inhabitants.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.0481*** 0.0456*** 0.0466*** 0.0464*** 0.0455***
(0.0015) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0079)
Age
2
-0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Firmsize 0.0194*** 0.0193***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Bc Dummy -0.7619*** -0.2132*** -0.2149*** -0.2162*** -0.2114***
(0.0049) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0041)
Wc Dummy -0.4891*** -0.1452*** -0.1466*** -0.1468*** -0.1461***
(0.0049) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0031)
Specialization 0.0055*** 0.0015* 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0037
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0035)
Density 0.0221*** 0.0074*** 0.0056*** 0.0066*** 0.0020*
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011)
Market Potential 0.1088*** 0.0500*** 0.0453*** 0.0516*** 0.0464***
(0.0021) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0054) (0.0134)
Estimation mehtod OLS Within Within AKM IV-Within
Time & Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Time only Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
R
2
0.5249 0.3596 0.4412
Endog. Test (df=4) 1.1722
N. of individuals 24353 24353 24353 24353 24353
N. of observations 175700 175700 175700 175700 175700
Standard errors in parentheses with ***, ** and * respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 2. Regression results. Dependend valiable ln(wage)
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Whole 
population
LD provinces 
(destination)
HD provinces 
(destination)
LD provinces -0.0469*** -0.0614*** 0.0028
(origin) (0.0021) (0.0076) (0.0083)
[1184] [1037]
HD provinces 0.0474*** -0.0009 0.1089***
(origin) (0.0023) (0.0083) (0.0102)
[1042] [881]
Table 3. Skills distribution across provinces and migrants 
characteristics based on workplace: Density
Standard errors in parentheses with ***, ** and * respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Number of migrants are in square
brackets
Migration Flows
Whole 
population
LD provinces 
(destination)
HD provinces 
(destination)
LD provinces -0.0329*** -0.0407*** 0.0513***
(origin) (0.0023) (0.0054) (0.0049)
[2235] [2839]
HD provinces 0.0469*** 0.0121 0.1170***
(origin) (0.0028) (0.0089) (0.0079)
[885] [1278]
Table 4. Skills distribution across provinces and migrants
characteristics based on birthplace: Density
Standard errors in parentheses with ***, ** and * respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Number of migrants are in square
brackets
Migration Flows
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Whole 
population
LMP 
provinces 
(destination)
HMP 
provinces 
(destination)
LMP provinces -0.0279*** -0.0497*** 0.0374***
(origin) (0.0024) (0.0075) (0.0103)
[1251] [817]
HMP provinces 0.0310*** 0.0395*** 0.0416***
(origin) (0.0023) (0.0106) (0.0083)
[722] [1187]
Standard errors in parentheses with ***, ** and * respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Number of migrants are in square
brackets
Table 5. Skills distribution across provinces and migrants 
characteristics based on workplace: Market Potential
Migration Flows
Whole 
population
LMP 
provinces 
(destination)
HMP 
provinces 
(destination)
LMP provinces -0.0294*** -0.0143*** 0.0185***
(origin) (0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0059)
[2644] [2104]
HMP provinces 0.0393*** 0.0807*** 0.0912***
(origin) (0.0027) (0.0123) (0.0063)
[501] [1906]
Table 6. Skills distribution across provinces and migrants
characteristics based on birthplace: Market Potential
Migration Flows
Standard errors in parentheses with ***, ** and * respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Number of migrants are in square
brackets
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(1) (2)
Non movers living in HD province 0.0501*** dropped
(0.0012)
Moving to a HD province:
Observed 4 or more years before a move -0.0142* -0.0096*
(0.0081) (0.0056)
Observed 2-3 years before a move 0.0018 -0.0083*
(0.0066) (0.0048)
Observed 1 year before a move 0.0030 -0.0146**
(0.0078) (0.0051)
Observed 1 year after a move 0.0305*** 0.0044
(0.0083) (0.0054)
Observed 2-3 years after a move 0.0379*** 0.0021
(0.0072) (0.0052)
Observed 4 or more years after a move 0.0594*** 0.0073
(0.0095) (0.0064)
Leaving from a HD province:
Observed 4 or more years before a move 0.0264*** 0.0107**
(0.0075) (0.0053)
Observed 2-3 years before a move 0.0165** 0.0107
(0.0066) (0.0048)
Observed 1 year before a move -0.0006 0.0022
(0.0077) (0.005)
Observed 1 year after a move -0.0096 -0.001
(0.0087) (0.0055)
Observed 2-3 years after a move -0.0125* -0.0029
(0.0074) (0.0053)
Observed 4 or more years after a move 0.0087 0.002
(0.0104) (0.0069)
Estimation method OLS Within
R
2
0.5325 0.4026
N. of individuals 24353 24353
N. of observations 175700 175700
Table 7. Analysis of the wage growth hypothesis. Dependent variable ln(wage)
Standard errors in parentheses with ***, ** and * respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels. Regressions contains Age, Ageˆ2, Firmsize, Bc Dummy, Wc Dummy, Specialization,
Market Potential as well as year and sectoral dummies.
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Firm size 
premium by 
density
Firm size 
premium by 
market potential
LD provinces  0.0607*** 0.0618***
or  (0.0003) (0.0003)
LMP provinces  [15835] [14640]
HD provinces  0.0679*** 0.0663***
or  (0.0003) (0.0003)
HMP provinces  [13818] [14903]
Table 8. Distribution of the firm size effect by density and 
market potential
Standard errors in parentheses with ***, ** and * respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Number of firms is in square
brackets
torino
vercelli
novara
cuneo
asti
alessandria
aosta
imperia
savona
genova
la spezia
varese
como
sondrio
milanobergamobrescia
pavia
cremona
mantova
bolzano
trento
verona
vicenza
belluno
treviso
veneziapadova
rovigo
udine
gorizia
trieste
piacenza
parma
reggio emilia
modena
bolognaferrara
ravenna
forlì
pesaro
ancona
macerata
ascoli  piceno
massa
lucca
pistoia
firenze
livorno
pisa
arezzo
siena
grosseto perugia
t r i
viterbo
rieti
roma
latina
frosinone
caserta
benevento
napoli
avellino
salernol aquila
teramo
pescara
chieti
campobassofoggia
bari
t nt
brindisi
lecce
pot nza
matera
cosenza
catanzaro
reggio calabria
trapani palermomessina
agrigento
caltanisse ta
enna
catania
r gusasiracusa
sass ri
nuoro
cagliari
pordenone
isernia
oristano
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
A
ss
or
ta
tiv
e 
M
at
ch
in
g
1 2 3 4 5 6
Density
Figure 1: Assortative matching and market density
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